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Abstract 
This article engages with the legal regulation of end-of-existence decision-
making for novel beings, specifically assisted nonexistence for such entities. I 
explain the concept of a legal model for assisted death by reference to the 
substantive features of legal regimes in three jurisdictions in which assisted 
suicide or euthanasia is lawful. I consider how these models might fit novel 
beings who may require or prefer assistance to end their own existence by 
reference to the constituent features²abstract legal ingredients²that models for 
DVVLVWHGGHDWKVKDUH,DUJXHWKDWH[WDQWPRGHOVPD\EORFNVRPHQRYHOEHLQJV¶
access to end-of-existence assistance or fail to track what matters to them. I then 
examine the merits of adopting a universal model for assisted nonexistence, 
that is, a legal framework whose substantive features capture the end-of-
existence concerns of both human and novel beings. Consideration of a 
unified legal framework may illuminate the discussion of assisted nonexistence 
for humans and novel beings. However, I argue that while novel beings may 
have similar interests to humans, they may be relevantly different also. The 
prima facie case for adopting a one regime to rule us all approach to assisted 
nonexistence may be defeated by reasons for divergent regulation. 
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Novel beings and assisted nonexistence 
1. Introduction 
This article engages with the legal regulation of end-of-existence decision-
making for novel beings, specifically assisted nonexistence for such entities. While 
this may appear somewhat niche, in my view it is one whose analysis pays, for 
two reasons: first, the topic is of substantive, if speculative, interest²it is not 
implausible that some novel beings would possess a wish to end their own 
existence; second, analysis of assisted nonexistence for novel beings may 
facilitate our understanding of the concerns that underpin such choices to end 
existence in general and the adequacy of legal responses to these concerns. 
By way of plan: following some preliminaries (§2), I explain the concept of a 
legal model for assisted death by reference to the substantive features of legal 
regimes in three jurisdictions in which assisted suicide or euthanasia is lawful 
(§3). I consider how these models might fit novel beings who may require or 
prefer assistance to end their own existence by reference to the constituent 
features²abstract legal ingredients²that models for assisted death share. I argue 
that extant models may block VRPH QRYHO EHLQJV¶ access to end-of-existence 
assistance or fail to track what matters to them (§4). I then examine the merits 
of adopting a universal model for assisted nonexistence, that is, a legal 
framework whose substantive features capture the end-of-existence concerns of 
both human and novel beings. Consideration of a unified legal framework may 
illuminate the discussion of assisted nonexistence for humans and novel 
beings. However, I argue that while novel beings may have similar interests to 
humans, they may be relevantly different also. The prima facie case for adopting 
a one regime to rule us all approach to assisted nonexistence may be defeated by 
reasons for divergent regulation (§5). 
2. Preliminaries 
First, I should make clear who are the target of this article. David Lawrence and 
Margaret Brazier define QRYHOEHLQJVDVµLQWHOOLJHQWFRQVFLRXVOLIH-forms sapient 
LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ RU JUHDWHU WKDQ DUH KXPDQ EHLQJV¶1 Lawrence and Brazier 
XQGHUVWDQGVDSLHQFHWRµFDUU>\@ZLWKLWDQLPSOLFDWLRQRIZLVGRPUeason, and 
LQVLJKW¶2 This is a helpful starting point. As I understand it, the status of novel 
being refers to entities who are non-human yet are possessed of a conception 
of the good, as well as the capacities of appreciation (which implies knowledge 
of relevant aspects of the external world and how it affects subjective 
experience) and reason. These features or properties are important for the 
purposes of discussing end-of-existence decision-making, insofar as I take it that 
a legally valid decision, at least in this context, presupposes, inter alia, the 
                                                 
1 'DYLG5/DZUHQFHDQG0DUJDUHW%UD]LHUµ/HJDOO\+XPDQ"µ1RYHO%HLQJV¶DQG(QJOLVK/DZ¶
(2018) 26(2) Med Law Rev 309-327, 309. 
2 ibid 312. 
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capacity for (minimally) rational choice, which requires the aforementioned 
properties. I also take it that the novel beings in which I am interested are 
relevantly sentient, that is, they possess, inter alia, the capacity to fare well or to 
fare poorly from their own point of view. 
What kinds of novel beings do I have in mind specifically? Like Lawrence and 
Brazier, I suggest that two candidate sets of novel beings would be²they 
currently are not known to exist²those who possess artificial general 
intelligence (AGI) or who are the product of synthetic biology and endowed 
with sapience and sentience.3 Indeed, there may be an overlap between these 
two categories. While any attempt to provide examples from science fiction will 
doubtless prove controversial, we might think generally good candidates for the 
status of novel beings are HAL 9000 from 2001: a space odyssey,4 Samantha in 
Her,5 the Machine and Samaritan in Person of Interest,6 the replicants in Blade 
Runner,7 the humanoid Cylons in Battlestar Galactica,8 or the replicators in 
Stargate SG-1.9 A further candidate set of novel beings for discussion are post-
humans,10 WKDWLVLQGLYLGXDOVVXEMHFWWRµUDGLFDOHQKDQFHPHQW¶WKDWKDVWXUQHG
WKHPLQWRµIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQWNLQGVRIEHLQJVVRGLIIHUHQWWKDW>WKH\@ZLOO
no longer« be called human¶11 Such beings may, for example, enjoy the 
prospect of radically extended (and healthy) lifespans.12 
Second, to aid the discussion of assisted nonexistence, it is perhaps useful to 
add a further property to the novel beings under consideration. I stipulate that 
the target novel beings have reason to require or to prefer assistance to end 
their own existence. In my view, this makes the discussion of assisted 
nonexistence more salient, since it excludes those novel beings, for example, 
FHUWDLQµXQHPERGLHG¶$*,Ior whom there may exist no practical impediment 
or experiential cost to µVXLFLGH¶ without assistance. It includes novel beings, for 
example, who perhaps consistent with the third Asimov Law,13 or in virtue of 
replication or storage processes, will ODFNDFFHVVWRWKHLURZQµNLOOVZLWFK¶,WDOVR
includes those novel beings, for example, whose embodiment will be such that 
µVXLFLGH¶ZLWKRXWDVVLVWDQFHwould be possible, but less preferable, than assisted 
nonexistence. 
                                                 
3 ibid 314-317. 
4 Arthur C Clarke, 2001: a space odyssey (Hutchinson 1968). 
5 Spike Jonze, Her (Warner Bros 2013). 
6 Jonathan Nolan, Person of Interest (2011-2016). 
7 Ridley Scott, Blade Runner (Warner Bros 1982). 
8 Ronald D Moore, Battlestar Galactica (Sci-Fi 2004-09). 
9 Brad Wright and Jonathan Glassner, Stargate SG-1 (Showtime; Sci-Fi 1997-2007). 
10 Lawrence and Brazier (n 1) 312. 
11 Nicholas Agar, Humanity's end: why we should reject radical enhancement (MIT Press 2010) 2. 
12 ibid Chapters 5 and 6. 
13 Isaac Asimov, I, robot (Gnome Press 1950). I see nothing incoherent in the idea that a 
novel being could, all else being equal, be hard-wired to protect its own existence while at the 
same time be possessed of the capacity to regret that it exists. 
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Third, I should explain the terminology used. In academic discussion of human 
end-of-life decision-making, it is common to see assisted dying used to refer to 
assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia.14 Unfortunately, within the public debate 
on the legalisation of end-of-life decision-making and assistance, certain 
organisations and politicians have attempted to redefine assisted dying as 
(physician) assisted suicide only.15 Whatever its political merits, this move has 
not served the ends of conceptual clarity. Therefore, I generally prefer the term 
assisted death to refer to assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia, which in any 
event is less euphemistic than assisted dying.16 However, for the purposes of 
this article, I have chosen to use the terms end-of-existence decision-making and 
assisted nonexistence in respect of novel beings. This is to avoid begging the 
question whether the novel beings under consideration are alive.17 
Fourth, and as a final stipulation, I assume that the novel beings in question 
possess legal personality. Of course, the basis and acquisition of legal 
personality for novel beings are not necessarily simple matters.18 However, to 
WKHH[WHQWWKDW,ZLVKWRGLVFXVVQRYHOEHLQJV¶HQMR\PHQWRIOHJDOULJKWVVXFKDV
access to lawful assisted nonexistence, it is necessary either to assume legal 
personality or argue for it. The former move enables me to proceed directly to 
my principal matters of interest. And, to be clear, assuming legal personality 
need not determine the substantive issue of assisted nonexistence. It is trite 
that the legal rights of entities endowed with legal subjectivity may differ.19 
Having set the scene, we can now proceed to consideration of legal models for 
assisted death for human beings. 
3. Legal models for assisted death 
In this section, I explain the concept of a legal model for assisted death. At the 
highest level of abstraction, I take a model for assisted death to be a legal 
framework that regulates assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia in a permissive 
way. Of course, there may be some difficulty in determining whether any one 
                                                 
14 See eg -RKQ&RJJRQµ$VVLVWHG'\LQJDQGWKH&RQWH[WRI'HEDWH³0HGLFDO/DZ´YHUVXV
³(QG-of-OLIH´/DZ¶0HG/DZ5HY-563. Richard HX[WDEOHµ6SOLWWLQJWKH
GLIIHUHQFH"3ULQFLSOHGFRPSURPLVHDQGDVVLVWHGG\LQJ¶%LRHWKLFV-480. 
3HQQH\/HZLVDQG,VUD%ODFNµ$GKHUHQFHWRWKHUHTXHVWFULWHULRQLQMXULVGLFWLRQVZKHUH
assisted dying is lawful? A review of the criteria and evidence in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
2UHJRQDQG6ZLW]HUODQG¶-/DZ0HG(WKLFV-898. 
15 See eg Assisted Dying (No 2) Bill 2015 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2015-2016/0007/16007.pdf accessed 
2019/12/12. 'LJQLW\LQ'\LQJµ2XU3RVLWLRQ¶https://www.dignityindying.org.uk/assisted-
dying/our-position/ accessed 2019/12/12. 
16 When one provides euthanasia or supplies medication that is subsequently used to fatal 
effect, one assists an individual to die, ie one assists death, not dying. 
17 See Lawrence and Brazier (n 1) 318 et seq. 
18 See Lawrence and Brazier (n 1). 
19 Consider the case of companies, adolescents, non-citizens etc. 
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jurisdiction regulates assisted death permissively,20 but there clearly are some 
jurisdictions that permit assisted death in some form and clearly are other 
jurisdictions that take a prohibitive stance. Still at a high level of abstraction, a 
legal model for assisted death regulates assisted suicide or euthanasia in a 
permissive way. Important to note is that different approaches to the legal 
regulation of assisted death are possible. 
I do not propose an exhaustive presentation of the legal regimes for assisted 
death in permissive jurisdictions²not least because their number is now 
numerous and ever-increasing. Rather, I shall focus on three regimes: Oregon,21 
the Netherlands,22 and Switzerland.23 I have chosen these regimes because they 
are representative of the way in which legal models for assisted death may 
differ.24 Differences notwithstanding, it is possible to identify a number of 
                                                 
20 eg There exists disagreement whether the legal regulation of assisted suicide in England 
and Wales, that is, whether the universal statutory prohibition on encouraging or assisting 
suicide contained in the Suicide Act 1961, s 2, subject to the requirement of prosecutorial 
consent to prosecution contained in s 2(4) of the Act (supported by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (2010, 
amended 2014) 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/legal_guidance/assisted-suicide-
policy.pdf accessed 2019/12/12), constitutes a permissive legal regime. cf Penney Lewis, µ>W@KH
'33KDV«LPSOLFLWO\GHVFULEH>G@DOEHLWLPSHUIHFWO\WKURXJKWKHXVHRIIDFWRUVIRUDQGDJDLQVW
prosecution) a class of assisted suicides ZKLFKDUHSHUPLVVLEOH¶µ,QIRUPDOOHJDOFKDQJHRQ
DVVLVWHGVXLFLGHWKHSROLF\IRUSURVHFXWRUV¶/6-134, 133 and Jonathan 
Montgomery, µWKH'LUHFWRUKDVVNLOIXOO\QHJRWLDWHGDSDWKWKDWFODULILHVKLVSURVHFXWLRQSROLF\
ZLWKRXWVWHSSLQJLQWROHJLVODWLYHWHUULWRU\¶µ*XDUGLQJWKHJDWHVRI6W3HWHUOLIHGHDWKDQGODZ
PDNLQJ¶/6-666, 664-665. 
21 Death with Dignity Act (Oregon); ORS §127.800-127.995. 
22 Wet toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding [Termination of Life on Request 
and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2002] (Euthanasia Act (Netherlands) 2002). 
English language translation: House of Lords, Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill, Volume II: Evidence (HL Paper 86-II, 2005) 396 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/86ii.pdf accessed 
2019/12/12. 
23 Code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937 [Swiss penal code of 21 December 1937], art 115 
partially criminalises suicide assistance. We shall see that the full legal picture is more 
complex: see Isra Black, µ([LVWHQWLDOVXIIHULQJDQGWKHH[WHQWRIWKHULJKWWRSK\VLFLDQ-assisted 
VXLFLGHLQ6ZLW]HUODQG*URVVY6ZLW]HUODQG>@(&+5¶0HG/DZ
Rev 109-118. 
24 The Oregonian and Dutch models are also important because they have been transferred 
(more or less) into other jurisdictions. Regarding Oregon, see Death with Dignity Act 
(Washington); RCW 70.245.010; Patient Choice and Control at the End of Life Act 
(Vermont); End of Life Option Act (California); End of Life Options Act (Colorado); Death 
with Dignity Act (District of Columbia); Our Care, Our Choices Act (Hawaii); Aid in Dying 
for the Terminally Ill Act (New Jersey). The Oregonian regime also provided the basis for 
recent attempts to legalise assisted suicide in England and & Wales and Scotland 
respectively: Assisted Dying (No 2) Bill 2015; Assisted Suicide (Scotland) Bill 2013. 
Regarding the Netherlands, see Loi relative à l'euthanasie du 28 mai 2002 [Law on euthanasia 
of 28 May 2002] (Euthanasia Law (Belgium) 2002) and Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l'euthanasie et 
l'assistance au suicide [Law of 16 March 2009 on euthanasia and assisted suicide] (Euthanasia 
Law (Luxembourg) 2009). The influence of Dutch regime is arguably visible in both the Act 
Respecting End-of-Life Care (Québec) and Bill C-14 (Medical assistance in dying) (Canada). 
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constituent features²abstract legal ingredients²that assisted dying laws share. My 
interest here is in the substantive features that bear on individual eligibility for 
assistance to die and the legal defaults that are, all else being equal, applicable 
in the event of non-compliance. These features provide the basis for later 
discussion and include: underlying prohibition, autonomous decision, age, type of 
assistance, qualifying condition, and institutionalisation.25 For simplicity, I shall not 
press this point here and present the law jurisdiction by jurisdiction. For 
reasons of brevity, I shall not detail (or later discuss) the procedural features of 
the Oregonian, Dutch, and Swiss laws,26 such as waiting periods,27 or reporting 
and scrutiny arrangements.28 
In Oregon, tKH RIIHQFH RI µDVVLVWLQJ DQRWKHU SHUVRQ WR FRPPLW VXLFLGH¶ LV
inapplicable to a physician who complies with the conditions set out in Death 
with Dignity Act.29 Under the Act, a terminally ill adult²aged 18 years or 
above30²resident who has capacity to take an informed decision and is acting 
voluntarily may request a prescription for lethal medication from their 
attending physician.31 7HUPLQDO LOOQHVV LV GHILQHG DV µDQ LQFXUDEOH DQG
irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within 
UHDVRQDEOHPHGLFDOMXGJPHQWSURGXFHGHDWKZLWKLQVL[PRQWKV¶32 
In the Netherlands, euthanasia and assisted suicide are prohibited by the 
Dutch Criminal Code, articles 293 and 294 respectively. However, physicians 
who comply with the due care criteria set out in the Euthanasia Act 
                                                 
25 Penney Lewis and I employ the idea of features or legal ingredients in The effectiveness of 
OHJDOVDIHJXDUGVLQMXULVGLFWLRQVWKDWDOORZDVVLVWHGG\LQJ¶%ULHILQJ3DSHUIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQRQ
Assisted Dying (Demos, 2012) http://philpapers.org/rec/LEWTEO-8 accessed 2019/12/12. 
The underlying prohibition IHDWXUHLVQHZDQG,UHIUDPHZKDWZHFDOOHGµLGHQWLW\RIWKHDVVLVWRU¶
as institutionalisation. 
26 Of course, individual provisions may contain both substantive and procedural elements, eg 
ORS 127.830 UHTXLUHVWKDWDSHUVRQWDNHDQµLQIRUPHGGHFLVLRQ¶ZKLFKLVGHILQHGLQ
ORS 127.800 §1.01.(7). DVDµGHFLVLRQ«EDVHGRQDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQWIDFWVand 
DIWHUEHLQJIXOO\LQIRUPHGE\WKHDWWHQGLQJSK\VLFLDQRI« [relevant matters pursuant to ORS 
127.816 §3.01.@¶ 
27 See eg ORS 127.840 §3.06. 
28 See 3HQQH\/HZLVDQG,VUD%ODFNµ5HSRUWLQJDQGVFUXWLQ\RIUHSRUWHGFDVHVLQIRXU
jurisdictions where assisted dying is lawful: A review of the evidence in the Netherlands, 
%HOJLXP2UHJRQDQG6ZLW]HUODQG¶0/,-239. 
29 ORS 163.193. 
30 127.800 §1.01.(1). 
31 ORS 127.810 µ$WWHQGLQJSK\VLFLDQ¶PHDQVµWKHSK\VLFLDQZKRKDVSULPDU\
responsibility for the care of the pDWLHQWDQGWUHDWPHQWRIWKHSDWLHQW¶VWHUPLQDOGLVHDVH¶ORS 
127.800 §1.01.(2). ORS 127.810 §2.02.(1). &DSDFLW\LVGHILQHGDVµWKHDELOLW\WRPDNHDQG
FRPPXQLFDWHKHDOWKFDUHGHFLVLRQVWRKHDOWKFDUHSURYLGHUV¶256127.800 §1.01.(3). 
Voluntariness is specified as a requirement but not defined in the Act, although 127.810 
§2.02. requires additionally that witnesses attest to the absence of coercion. An informed 
GHFLVLRQUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHUHTXHVWRUEDVHWKHLUGHFLVLRQRQDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRIµUHOHYDQWIDFWV¶
including diagnosis, prognosis, potential risks and probable consequences associated with 
WDNLQJOHWKDOPHGLFDWLRQDVZHOODVµIHDVLEOHDOWHUQDWLYHV¶WRVXLFLGHORS 127.800 §1.01.(7). 
32 ORS 127.800 §1.01.(12). 
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(Netherlands) 2002, section 2 have a defence to these offences.33 The attending 
physician,34 may, all else being equal, provide voluntary euthanasia or assisted 
VXLFLGHWRDQLQGLYLGXDOZKRSRVVHVVHVLQIRUPDWLRQµDERXWKLVVLWXDWLRQDQGKLV
SURVSHFWV¶ZKRKDVµPDGHYROXQWDU\DQGFDUHIXOO\FRQVLGHUHGUHTXHVW¶35 who 
KDVµXQEHDUDEOH¶VXIIHULQJIRUZKLFKWKHUHLVµQRSURVSHFWRILPSURYHPHQW¶DQG
IRU ZKRP WKHUH H[LVWV µQR UHDVRQDEOH DOWHUQDWLYH¶ WR DVVLVWHG GHDWK36 The 
suffering requirement is less broad than might first appear; while the courts 
have interpreted the due care criteria to permit assisted death for somatic and 
non-somatic suffering,37 existential suffering²suffering whose principal source is 
not clinical illness or impairment, for example, arising from being µWLUHG RI
OLIH¶²is not a permissible ground, for waQW RI D µPHGLFDOO\ UHFRJQLVDEOH
FRQGLWLRQ¶38 The Dutch regime enables access to assisted death for adults, 
minors aged 16 and 17 years following consultation with those exercising 
parental responsibility,39 and minors aged 12 to 15 years upon the agreement 
of those exercising parental responsibility.40 
The Swiss Criminal Code, article 115 criminalises only the conduct of 
individuals who, acting on selfish motives, encourage or assist suicide. This 
prima facie permissive regime has no age limitation and enables, inter alia, the 
existence of µULJKW WR GLH¶ RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZKR SURYLGH QRW-for-profit suicide 
assistance.41 However, as I note elsewhere: 
Physician-DVVLVWHG VXLFLGH« LV VXEMHFW WR DGGLWLRQDO UHJXODWLRQ 7KH
prescription of sodium pentobarbital, the preferred lethal medication«in 
Switzerland, is subject to federal narcotics and [federal] therapeutic products 
law.42 
The federal narcotics regime and therapeutic products regimes require that 
lethal medication is prescribed in accordance with good medical practice.43 
                                                 
33 Euthanasia Act (Netherlands) 2002, s 20. 
34 µ>7@KHSK\VLFLDQZKRDFFRUGLQJWRWKHQRWLILFDWLRQKDVWHUPLQDWHGOLIHRQUHTXHVWRUKDV
SURYLGHGDVVLVWDQFHZLWKVXLFLGH¶LELGVF 
35 Making a µFDUHIXOO\FRQVLGHUHG¶UHTXHVWrequires the possession of decision-making capacity: 
/HZLVDQG%ODFNµ$GKHUHQFHWRWKHUHTXHVWFULWHULRQLQMXULVGLFWLRQVZKHUHDVVLVWHGG\LQJLV
lawful? A review of the criteria and evidence in the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon, and 
6ZLW]HUODQG¶. 
36 ibid s 2(1). 
37 Chabot NJ 1994, no 656 (NL Supreme Court). ie Assistance is neither limited to terminal 
LOOQHVVQRUµSK\VLFDO¶FRQGLWLRQV 
38 Brongersma NJ 2003, no 167 (NL Supreme Court). 
39 ibid s 2(3). 
40 ibid s 2(4). 
41 *HRUJ%RVVKDUGµ6ZLW]HUODQG¶LQ-RKQ*ULIILWKV+HOHHQ:H\HUVDQG0DXULFH$GDPVHGV
Euthanasia and law in Europe (Hart 2008) 474. 
42 Black (n 23) 110. The relevant statutes are: Loi fédérale sur les stupéfiants et les substances 
psychotropes du 3 octobre 1951 [Federal law on narcotics and psychotropic substances of 3 
October 1951] (LStup); Loi fédérale sur les médicaments et les dispositifs médicaux du 15 décembre 
2000 [Federal law on medicines and medical devices of 15 December 2000] (LPTh). 
43 LStup, art 11(1); LPTh, art 26. 
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Misuse or negligence is backed by criminal sanction.44 In addition, Cantonal 
health law requires that physicians comply with good medical practice, which 
is backed by administrative sanction.45 
At present, there is a lack of legal guidance as to the permissible bounds of 
physician assisted suicide in Switzerland. The problem lies in determining what 
individual circumstances are consistent with good medical practice for the 
purposes of prescribing lethal medication. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court 
in the Haas case KHOG D µPHGLFDO LQGLFDWLRQ¶ WREH D UHTXLUHPHQW IRU ODZIXO
prescription of lethal medication under the federal narcotics and therapeutic 
products regimes.46 The court accepted that, in addition to physician assisted 
suicide when an individuDOZLWKDVRPDWLFGLVHDVHLVµDSSURDFKLQJWKHHQGRI
OLIH¶ the prescription of sodium pentobarbital to mentally disordered 
individuals may be consonant with good medical practice, subject to the further 
condition that the individual requesting assistance undergoes an extensive 
psychiatric evaluation.47 These statements might be thought to constitute legal 
authority that possibly includes other non-fatal medical conditions, but 
excludes physician assisted suicide for existential suffering. The latter claim 
finds support in the Federal Supreme Court judgment in Gross.48 However, in 
Gross v Switzerland,49  the second section of the European Court of Human 
Rights WRRNLVVXHZLWK)HGHUDO6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUHOLDQFHRn the Swiss Academy 
of Medical Sciences (SAMS) guidance on Care of patients at the end of life as an 
authoritative statement of good medical practice.50 The section noted that these 
                                                 
44 LStup, arts 20(1)(e); LPTh, art 86(1)(a). 
45 Bosshard (n 41) 473. 
46 Haas Entscheid 2A48/2006 (3 November 2006) (BGer) [6.3.2]. English language translated 
extracts: Haas v Switzerland (2011) 53 EHRR 33 (ECtHR) [16]. See Isra Blackµ6XLFLGH
assistance for mentally disordered individuals in Switzerland and the state's positive 
REOLJDWLRQWRIDFLOLWDWHGLJQLILHGVXLFLGH¶0HG/DZ5HY-166. 
47 Haas (n 46) [6.3.4.]-[6.3.5.2.]. 
48 Gross Entscheid 2C_9/2010 (12 April 2010) (BGer). English language translated extracts: 
Gross v Switzerland (2014) 58 EHRR 7 (ECtHR) [32]-[33]. 
49 Gross v Switzerland (n 49). 
50 Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences, Care of patients in the end of life (2004, revised 2013) 
https://www.samw.ch/dam/jcr:de64e102-1495-4c48-9fbd-
1c7d4d45932f/guidelines_sams_end_of_life_2012.pdf accessed 2019/12/12. The new 
SAMS guidance replaces WKHWHUPLQDOLOOQHVVUHTXLUHPHQWZLWKDFRQGLWLRQWKDWµ>W@KH
symptoms of disease and/or functional impairments are a source of intolerable suffering for 
WKHSDWLHQW>IURPWKHLURZQSHUVSHFWLYH@¶ZKLFKDSSHDUVLQFOXVLYHRIQRQ-fatal conditions and 
possibly some cases of existential suffering: Medical-ethical guidelines: Management of death and 
dying (2018) 23 https://www.samw.ch/dam/jcr:25f44f69-a679-45a0-9b34-
5926b848924c/guidelines_sams_dying_and_death.pdf accessed 2019/12/12. I have added 
the text in square brackets to clarify the English language version, based on the French 
language guidance, which reads: «Les symptômes de la maladie et/ou les limitations 
fonctionnelles du patient lui causent une souffrance TX¶LOMXJHLQVXSSRUWDEOH» (emphasis added). 
The shift to this condition has proven controversial, with the Swiss Medical Association 
(FMH), for the first time, refusing to adopt the guidance into its own Code of Ethics, on 
grounds that the term (subjectively appreciated) intolerable suffering was an indeterminate 
legal notion that gave rise to uncertainty for physicians: µ/D)0+QHUHSUHQGSDVOHV
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JXLGHOLQHVHPDQDWHIURPDµQRQ-JRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQLVDWLRQ¶DQGWKXVODFNWKH
µIRUPDOTXDOLW\RIODZ¶necessary to satisfy the ECHR, article 8(2) requirement 
that interference with the ECHR article 8(1) right to decide how and when to 
die be in accordance with the law.51 As such:  
Swiss law, while providing the possibility of obtaining a lethal dose of 
sodium pentobarbital on medical prescription, does not provide sufficient 
guidelines ensuring clarity as to the extent of this right.52 
Specifically, it lacks µFOHDU6WDWH-approved guidelines¶to govern cases in which 
µGHDWK LV QRW LPPLQHQW DV D UHVXOW RI D VSHFLILF PHGLFDO FRQGLWLRQ¶.53 
Notwithstanding that the section judgment is now moot,54 there is force in this 
criticism. It is difficult to know with certainty what qualifying conditions fall 
within the ambit of lawful physician assisted suicide in Switzerland.55  
Having outlined the substantive features of three legal models for assisted death 
for human beings, we may proceed to consider the extent to which these legal 
models might enable novel beings to access assisted nonexistence. 
4. Assisted nonexistence for novel beings within assisted death law? 
My aim in this section is to consider the fittingness of human assisted death 
models to novel beings. I shall discuss fit of model by reference to constituent 
features I identified in the previous section: underlying prohibition, age, type of 
assistance, qualifying condition, and institutionalisation.56 I shall pursue two claims: 
first, substantive features of assisted death regimes may block access to assisted 
nonexistence; second, accessible assisted death regimes may lack salience²they 
may fail to capture the kinds of concerns that might plausibly matter to novel 
beings. 
Underlying prohibition. We can contrast models, like Oregon and the 
Netherlands, that carve the lawfulness of physician assisted death out of 
universal prohibitions on suicide assistance or consensual killing, with models 
                                                 
GLUHFWLYHVGHO¶$660©$WWLWXGHIDFHjODILQGHYLHHWjODPRUWªGDQVVRQ&RGHGH
déontRORJLH¶
https://www.fmh.ch/files/pdf23/communique_de_presse_la_chambre_medicale_est_favora
ble_a_une_revision_du_tarif_en_partenariat.pdf accessed 2019/12/12. In consequence, the 
2004 SAMS guidance remains in the FMH Code of Ethics. 
51 Gross v Switzerland (n 49) [65]-[67]. 
52 ibid [67]. 
53 ibid [66]. 
54 The Grand Chamber declared the case inadmissible for abuse of rights: Gross v Switzerland 
(+55(&W+56HH,VUD%ODFNµ$SRVWVFULSWWR*URVVY6ZLW]HUODQG¶
22(4) Med Law Rev 656. 
55 I take it that the fact that physician assisted suicide has been provided without sanction to 
individuals who are neither terminally ill nor mentally ill is not determinative of its legality: 
Black (n 23) 110-111. 
56 I shall not discuss the autonomous decision criterion, since I doubt that²unlike the 
others²this criterion poses any problems for novel beings. 
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that, like Switzerland, contain a limited prohibition and a more rigorous 
regime for physician assisted death. This may matter to novel beings to the 
extent that in latter the Swiss-type model, there is legal space for the growth of 
an assisted nonexistence regime.57 In the former carveout-type model, we find 
no default space for assisted nonexistence for novel beings that is relevantly 
different to assisted death for human beings. That is, in the absence of 
permissive legal change, novel beings must satisfy the substantive criteria of 
human assisted death regimes. I now show how this might be problematic in 
the ways suggested above. 
Age. It is plausible that some novel beings may come into existence endowed 
with capacities and experience commensurate with adult human beings. This 
may be the case, for example, for µinitially-SURJUDPPHG¶novel beings such as 
droids.58 Alternatively, QRYHO EHLQJV¶ development may elapse over a 
substantially shorter duration than humans. For example, we may create or 
encounter AGIs who have very high processing capacities and access to large 
quantities of energy that enable them to develop at speed. The issue is that 
age²set according to a human chronological baseline²may be a poor proxy for 
the development of the capacities that enable an individual rationally to 
evaluate her own existence. Relatedly, age may fail to track the acquisition of 
experience commensurate with the development of a stable conception of the 
good. It may also fail to mark the point at which others interested in an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VZHOIDUHought no longer to shield the latter from the consequences 
of her action, for reasons of her own prudential good. In addition, it may be 
that some novel beings lead complete µlives¶ over short spaces of time, such that 
justifiable reluctance to permit certain activities in the case of young humans 
may be inappropriate in the case of chronologically young novel beings. Thus 
the restriction of assisted death to adults or even to minors of a certain age²
understood in a human sense²may result in novel beings who meet the other 
substantive criteria for assisted death, being ineligible in virtue of chronological 
age and facing a significant wait. 
Type of assistance. The kind of assisted death available to human beings may be 
thought to be of diminishing practical relevance. This is because the existence 
of technology such as the Deliverance Machine,59 the Thanatron,60 and most 
recently the Sarco,61 may enable physically impaired individuals to perform 
                                                 
57 See Bosshard (n 41) 472 for an overview of the history of organised assisted suicide in 
Switzerland. 
58 The thought here is that some novel beings may start off with a pre-determined set of 
features but possess the ability to develop their own subjectivity over time. 
59 6FLHQFH0XVHXPµ(XWKDQDVLDPDFKLQH$XVWUDOLD-¶
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/objects/display.aspx?id=91717 accessed 
2019/12/12. 
60 :LUHGµ7KH7KDQDWURQ-DFN.HYRUNLDQ
V'HDWK0DFKLQH¶
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2007/06/the_thanatron_j/ accessed 2019/12/12. 
61 ([LW,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ7KH6DUFR¶https://exitinternational.net/sarco/ accessed 
19/12/12. 
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suicide in a way that entails reduced risk of experiential trauma for the 
individual who dies or witnesses,62 and a reduced risk of failure.63 As such, in 
the future it may not matter to human beings whether euthanasia is lawful, 
provided assisted suicide is. However, whether the legal regime requires novel 
beings to end their own existence or permits third party existence-ending 
conduct may matter to novel beings. If a jurisdiction only permits assisted 
suicide, this may exclude access to some novel beings. In the preliminaries I 
stated that some of the novel beings in which I take an interest may have reason 
to require assistance to end their own existence, because their nature is such 
that they cannot perform suicide. For example, if code that would permit an 
AGI to self-destroy is kept air-gapped and physically inaccessible, its only route 
to nonexistence is via third party assistance. 
Qualifying condition. The requirement that an individual have a specific 
condition, such as terminal illness or mental disorder, in order to be eligible 
for lawful assisted death may make some novel beings ineligible for assisted 
nonexistence. Additionally, the comparative prevalence of a certain conditions 
among novel beings may entail that the legal regime for assisted death fails to 
address their salient end-of-existence concerns. For example, while it is not 
totally implausible to think of analogues to terminal illness or physical or 
psychological decline for some novel beings, for example, viruses for AGIs, 
disease for synthetic lifeforms, or even mechanical decline for droids, it is an 
open question whether such analogues would represent what matters most to 
novel beings as a population. Arguably, it would not. If we imagine future 
entities with extended lifespans²perhaps because of the ability to embody and 
disembody, their end-of-existence concerns might plausibly be existential; there 
may come a time when the experience of such beings equates to several full 
human lives and are simply µWLUHGRIH[LVWHQFH¶ If we consider that existential 
suffering may also arise in virtue of DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V VRFLDO FLUFXPVWDQFHVZH
might encounter novel beings who experience obsolescence, lack of 
opportunity, loss of self-esteem, isolation, or social stigma, all of which may give 
rise to grave suffering. Yet these ills are not the product of a loss or decline in 
functioning in the individual. As such, models for assisted death with suffering 
criteria may capture the existential end-of-existence concerns of novel beings. 
But they will fail to do so if²as is the case in the Netherlands²there is the 
additional requirement that suffering have a health-related origin. Only 
suffering-oriented models with less causally prescriptive suffering criteria or a 
liberal underlying criminal and regulatory framework can accommodate 
assisted nonexistence for existential reasons.  
                                                 
62 eg Arising from the need to ingest lethal medication, or voluntarily stopping eating and 
drinking.  
63 In Oregon, there have been a very small number of cases (n=8) in which individuals have 
regained consciousness after an attempt to utilise prescribed lethal medication: Oregon 
Public Health Division, Oregon Death with Dignity Act: 2018 Data Summary (2019) Table 2 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/deathwithdi
gnityact/Documents/year21.pdf accessed 2016/12/12. 
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Institutionalisation. All the models discussed in the previous section contain 
some degree of ex ante institutionalisation. The Oregonian and Dutch models 
entrust provision of assisted death exclusively to a social institution, viz, the 
medical profession. The Swiss model permits anyone to assist suicide, but also 
permits medical involvement, subject to more stringent conditions. In 
jurisdictions in which the provision of assisted death is exclusively 
institutionalised, this may have the consequence of bounding the regime along 
professional lines. As we have seen, for example, in the Netherlands, a medical 
condition is required in order for physician assisted death to be lawful. 
Institutionalisation may therefore pose a problem for novel beings who require 
or desire assistance to end their own existence. Medicine might plausibly 
expand to accommodate the concerns of some novel beings, particularly those 
who are biological in a relevant sense. However, the care of other novel beings, 
for example, entirely robotic AGIs, may fall outside the domain of medicine. 
Medicalisation may be one way in which the institutionalisation of assisted death 
PD\EORFNQRYHOEHLQJV¶DFFHVVWRDVVLVWHGQRQH[LVWHQFH 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the substantive criteria of models for 
assisted death may be a poor fit for novel beings. To accommodate the claims 
of novel beings to assisted nonexistence, the legal regimes for assisted death 
may require reconceptualization. However, in the next section, I shall argue 
that any such reconceptualization requires careful and critical treatment. 
5. Lawful assisted nonexistence for all? 
My analysis of models for assisted death exposes apparent shortcomings in 
some or all of the legal regimes discussed. Assessed critically, the content of 
these models may fail to capture the potential diversity in novel beings or the 
range of reasons why such entities may suffer and, in consequence, form a 
preference for assisted nonexistence. Concretely, background prohibitions on 
assisted death, the exclusion of euthanasia, eligibility restrictions going to 
chronological age and qualifying condition, and medicalisation may all serve 
to deny overlapping classes of novel being access to assisted nonexistence. 
In light of these forecasts, we might plausibly respond by formulating a legal 
model for assisted nonexistence that is in principle applicable both to human 
and novel beings, that is, a model that captures the end-of-existence concerns 
of both populations. Indeed, to the extent that the preceding discussion of the 
fittingness of assisted death models to novel beings is allegorical to potentially 
unattended human claims to assisted death, a rethink may appear welcome. 
It is likely that a unified legal regime for assisted nonexistence would be frugal 
in its substantive criteria. We might envisage in terms of its features: the 
absence of any chronological age criteria; the absence of restriction on the 
means employed²euthanasia and assisted suicide would be lawful; a suffering 
criterion without health-related origin restriction; and the absence of 
medicalisation²or institutionalisation generally. On this model, it would, all 
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else being equal, be lawful for anyone to provide assisted nonexistence to 
humans and novel beings when they possess relevant knowledge, have decision-
making capacity, are free of autonomy-undermining third party influence, and 
their existence entails grave suffering to which assisted nonexistence is a 
proportionate response. 
A pared-down model for assisted nonexistence potentially has much to 
commend to it. To cite one argument that might be offered in its support, a 
narrow qualifying condition restriction, such as terminal illness, may seem 
unprincipled. Terminal illness is at best a proxy for the kind of suffering that 
gives rise to a wish for nonexistence. We might infer, for example, from the 
low absolute numbers of individuals who have availed themselves of physician 
assisted suicide in Oregon and the fact that more than a third of individuals 
issued a prescription for lethal medication have not used it,64 that not all 
terminally ill individuals suffer gravely.65 Moreover, insofar as the terminally ill 
are, by definition, not long for this world, they may suffer less than other 
individuals who face the prospect of many years of existence.66 As Lord 
Neuberger argued in R (oao Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice: 
there seems to me to be significantly more justification in assisting people 
to die if they have the prospect of living for many years a life that they 
regarded as valueless, miserable and often painful, than if they have only a 
few months left to live.67 
There may be a compelling argument, therefore, for abandoning terminal 
illness as a criterion for assisted nonexistence in favour of a suffering-based, 
criterion. Moreover, it may be difficult to limit, as a matter of principle, any 
suffering criterion to a health-related origin. As Richard Huxtable and Maaike 
Möller note, ³6XIIHULQJ´LWVHOILVQRWDPHGLFDOWHUPDQG« DOWKRXJK³LOOQHVV´LV
a significant cause thereof, it by no PHDQVFRPPDQGVDPRQRSRO\¶68 As noted 
above, an entity may suffer gravely in virtue of being tired of existence or fare 
very poorly in virtue of social factors that are in practice as intractable as 
terminal or chronic disease. As such, it may seem arbitrary to permit assisted 
                                                 
64 2,217 prescriptions were written for individuals under the Death with Dignity Act 
(Oregon) between 1997 and 2018; 1,459 were used: Oregon Public Health Division (n 63) 5, 
Table 2. 
65 I appreciate that some terminally ill individuals would suffer gravely without the option of 
physician assisted suicide, ie, the provision of a prescription for lethal medication itself 
provides succour. 
66 Of course, I am not suggesting that the suffering of terminally ill individuals is never 
sufficient to qualify for assisted nonexistence. 
67 R (oao Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice; R (oao AM) v DPP [2014] UKSC 38 [122]. 
68 RicKDUG+X[WDEOHDQG0DDLNH0|OOHUµ6HWWLQJD3ULQFLSOHG%RXQGDU\"(XWKDQDVLDDVD
5HVSRQVHWR
/LIH)DWLJXH
¶%LRHWKLFV-126. 
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nonexistence for suffering with a health-related origin while excluding all 
suffering that is existential.69 
AUJXPHQWVIURPµGHPHGLFDOLsDWLRQ¶PD\DOVRWHOOLQIDYRXURIOLPLWHGUHJXODWLRQ
of assisted nonexistence. Tania Salem argues that physician assisted suicide 
µWUDQVIRUPV D SULYDWH DFW VXLFLGH LQWR D PHGLFDO HYHQW¶, and in so doing 
individuals cede personal autonomy to the medical profession.70 For it is 
physiciansLQYLUWXHRIµWKHVRFLDODQGV\PEROLFSRZHU«FRQIHUUHGRQPHGLFLQHDQG
medical professionals in our societies¶71 µZKRDUHLQFKDUJHRIIUHHLQJSDWLHQWVIURP
PHGLFLQH¶DWWKHHQGRIOLIHWKURXJKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVVXEPLW
µWRPHGLFDOQRUPVDQG VFUXWLQ\¶  LQRUGHU WRJDLQDFFHVV WRDVVLVWHGGHDWK72 
8QGHU PHGLFDOLVDWLRQ 6DOHP REVHUYHV µSHRSOH« have physician assisted 
suicide not only because they want it, but because physicians agree they can 
KDYHLW¶73 A demedicalised model for assisted nonexistence might be thought 
partially to return control of the decision how and when no longer to exist to 
individuals. The important point is not that individuals would gain total 
control over assisted nonexistence; this is false²a wish to die with assistance 
would remain subject to the willing cooperation of others. Rather, the claim is 
that greater scope for self-determination would exist were control over assisted 
nonexistence to be wrested from the social institution of medicine and 
decentralised to individuals and assistors. 
No doubt there are further examples of how a legal model designed to capture 
the concerns of novel beings might lead to a legal regime that is better for all²
that is better for human and novel beings. However, at this juncture I would 
like to problematise a one regime to rule us all approach to assisted nonexistence. 
I shall argue using the examples discussed²qualifying condition and 
medicalisation²that we have cause to question whether unified treatment of 
assisted nonexistence is the optimal way to regulate end-of-existence for human 
and novel beings. 
The argument offered for an expansive qualifying condition criterion as 
presented fails to account for a potentially important factor: that the reason for 
restriction on eligibility is less about individuals who possess a wish for assisted 
nonexistence, and more about individuals who have no desire for the latter  
but who might be exposed to pressure to request it, or who might be inclined 
imprudently to request assisted non-existence. $V 6X]DQQH 2VW REVHUYHV µa 
potential danger of loosening the medical criteria for assisted death is that it 
                                                 
69 I take it that if such social factors are not intractable in principle or in some reasonable 
practical sense, this grounds a general reason against assisted death, for both humans and 
novel beings.  
70 7DQLD6DOHPµ3K\VLFLDQ-$VVLVWHG6XLFLGH3URPRWLQJ$XWRQRP\RU0HGLFDOL]LQJ6XLFLGH"¶
(1999) 29(3) Hastings Cent Rep 30-36, 30. 
71 ibid 33 (original emphasis). 
72 ibid 35. 
73 ibid. 
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becomes harder to identify and maintain boundaries¶.74 Of course, it is in part 
an empirical and in part a normative matter which among terminal illness or 
suffering (health-origin or less restrictive) would produce an acceptable 
distribution of access to assisted nonexistence and exposure to risk. Resolving 
the issue is not necessary for our purposes.75 The relevant point is that there 
may exist different risk profiles between human and novel beings and indeed 
between classes of novel being. It is not implausible to think that some novel 
beings may be impervious to autonomy-undermining third party influence, 
irrational decision-making, or weakness of will (akrasia), whereas others may 
share similar µvulnerabilities¶ to humans. As such, we may have reason to 
believe that some classes of beings ought to be subject to more relaxed or 
restrictive eligibility for assisted non-existence respectively, because of the other-
regarding (but within class) implications of a qualifying condition criterion. 
Thus the legal model for assisted nonexistence should vary according to the 
nature of the beings subject to the measure. In short, novel beings may have 
similar end-of-existence concerns to humans, but they may be relevantly unlike 
us for the purposes of regulatory response. 
In respect of demedicalisation, let us accept, for the sake of argument, 6DOHP¶V
general claim that the medicalisation impacts on individual self-
determination.76 I also accept that the demedicalisation of assisted 
nonexistence would be a requirement for novel beings whose care stood 
outside the medical domain. However, I submit that there are principled 
arguments for medicalisation,77 or at least the institutionalisation of assisted 
nonexistence. As such, we need not abandon medicalisation for human beings 
or commit to deinstitutionalised assisted nonexistence for novel beings. 
In my view, the strongest, albeit contingent, argument for medicalisation (as 
opposed to institutionalisation generally) stems from the claim that the 
purpose of medicine, properly understood, is to alleviate suffering. As Eric 
Cassell arguesµWhe mandate for the existence of a profession of medicine in 
society is its obligation to relieve the suffering caused by human sickness¶.78 
Conceiving of the goals of medicine in this way permits the observation that, 
in models that contain a suffering criterion, the provision of assisted 
nonexistence by physicians rests in part on familiar reasons. As such, 
                                                 
74 6X]DQQH2VWµ7KH'H-Medicalisation of Assisted Dying: Is a Less Medicalised Model the 
:D\)RUZDUG"¶0HG/DZ5HY-540, 526, n 141. 
75 See ,VUD%ODFNµ5HIXVLQJ/LIH-3URORQJLQJ0HGLFDO7UHDWPHQWDQGWKH(&+5¶
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 299-327, 316-318 for discussion in the context of refusal of 
life-prolonging medical treatment. 
76 cf 5LFKDUG+X[WDEOHµ:KDWHYHU<RX:DQW"%H\RQGWKH3DWLHQWLQ0HGLFDO/DZ¶
16(3) Health Care Anal 288-301; Coggon (n 14) 543-544. 
77 There are pragmatic arguments for medicalisation too. As Ost (n 74) QQRWHVµLW
is arguably better to advocate the model that is more likely to be acceptable to the legislature 
DQGSXEOLF«DGYRFDWHVRIOHJDOUHIRUPVKRXOGXQLWHWKHLUFODLPVZLWKZLGHO\DFFHSWHGFXOWXUDO
YDOXHVWKHSURFHVVRI³IUDPHDOLJQPHQW´¶ 
78 Eric J Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine (2nd edn, OUP 2004) 61. 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
physicians, ought to possess the interpretive and analogical skills that would 
permit the exercise of discretion in respect of requests for assisted 
nonexistence.79 I submit that this may be true regardless of whether the 
suffering in question is of a health-related origin or existential in nature, for 
the skills in question go to the recognition of suffering and of the appropriate 
response thereto. My argument is that medicalisation entrusts the operation of 
assisted nonexistence to a profession that is, in principle, equipped with the 
analytical tools to discharge it well. It would seem unnecessary to demedicalise 
assisted nonexistence for human beings merely because demedicalisation for 
novel beings were necessary, for example, if the means employed to end 
existence were not medical in nature. Instead, the legal models for human and 
novel beings plausibly ought to diverge. 
It is possible to argue for deinstitutionalised assisted nonexistence for everyone, 
however. This might be because the absence of institutionalisation would entail 
the abandonment of the suffering criterion, because of the absence of 
involvement of social institutions with substantive commitments to the good,80 
VXFK DV WKH GXW\ WR DFW LQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V EHVW LQWHUHVWV As such, 
deinstitutionalised assisted nonexistence might find support on liberal 
neutrality grounds; the argument being that the State should not interfere in 
the autonomous choices of its citizens.81 
I would argue, however, that rather than commit to a deinstitutionalised 
regime for assisted nonexistence for everyone, we ought to maintain 
medicalised assisted nonexistence for human beings and, if possible, to find an 
institutional home for assisted nonexistence for novel beings. First, it is 
desirable to institutionalise assisted nonexistence, to the extent that it permits 
ex ante scrutiny of requests for end-of-existence assistance,82 which may 
attenuate the ex post involvement of the coronial, police, and prosecutorial 
authorities.83 Second, and relatedly, institutionalisation may be necessary in 
order to prevent, as opposed merely to punish, improper assisted nonexistence. 
Third, there is a sense of good²conceived as DFKLHYLQJRQH¶Vown ends well²
that is compatible with liberal neutrality and that institutionalisation of assisted 
nonexistence might promote. Institutionalisation may help entities to receive 
competent assistance to end their own existence, that is, assistance that has a 
high probability of success and that involves the minimum amount of suffering; 
                                                 
79 I am not suggesting WKDWSK\VLFLDQVQHFHVVDULO\SRVVHVVWKHVHVNLOOV,QGHHG&DVVHOO¶VFULWLTXH
is that modern medicine has lost its connection to suffering: ibid. 
80 Coggon (n x) 543-544. 
81 See Ronald Dworkin, Life's dominion: an argument about abortion, euthanasia, and individual 
freedom (1st edn, Knopf 1993). 
82 See Roger Brownsword, Penney LewLVDQG*HQHYUD5LFKDUGVRQµ3URVSHFWLYH/HJDO
,PPXQLW\DQG$VVLVWDQFHZLWK'\LQJ6XEPLVVLRQWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQRQ$VVLVWHG'\LQJ¶
(2012) 23(2) KLJ 181-193; Ost (n 74) 537. 
83 My claim here is not that there would be no ex post review of assisted nonexistence, but 
that such review may be lighter touch, eg if there is a µbuffer¶ between assistors and the 
institutions of criminal or administrative justice: Lewis and Black (n 28) 238. 
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deinstitutionalised assisted end of existence cannot ensure this.84 
Institutionalisation may also assist in weeding out irrational or akratic requests 
for assisted non-existence. Fourth, and perhaps controversially, I would suggest 
that the State ought to institutionalise assisted nonexistence precisely because 
it permits the imposition of a substantive conception of the good. In my view, 
it is important, both for the sake of the individual who will cease to exist and 
for the sake of their assistor, that the reasons for providing assisted 
nonexistence go beyond mere respect for autonomy or even respect for an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V RZQ conception of the good. To this end, I would respectfully 
endorse the dictum of Lady Hale in R (oao Purdy) v DPP: 
It is not for society to tell people what to value about their own lives. But it 
may be justifiable for society to insist that we value their lives even if they 
do not.85 
The upshot of these arguments is that it may be preferable not to unify the legal 
regulation of assisted nonexistence, notwithstanding that human and novel 
beings may share the concerns that motivate a desire for assisted end of 
existence. 
6. Conclusion: similar interests, different models? 
In this article, I have attempted to engage with the issue of how the law might 
regulate assisted nonexistence for novel beings. I outlined three models 
governing assisted death for human beings. Taking the constituent features of 
these models as a frame, I considered the potential obstacles novel beings might 
encounter were they to seek access to assisted nonexistence; these were 
manifold. I subsequently considered a one regime to rule us all approach to 
assisted nonexistence, that is, a legal model applicable to both human and 
novel beings. While prima facie attractive, I argued that a unified legal model 
for assisted nonexistence may fail to take into account relevant differences 
between human and novel beings; it may lead us to choose or abandon legal 
criteria that serve a useful purpose for human or novel beings. In sum, there 
may be merit in divergent legal regulation of assisted nonexistence. 
If I may end on a brief methodological note, my approach to the study of end-
of-existence involving novel beings has been to attend to potential common 
ground between human and novel beings, and also relevant differences 
between them. I suggest that both human and novel beings share an interest in 
deciding how and when to die. But how we respond to that interest in legal 
                                                 
84 It is perhaps telling that in Switzerland, almost all assisted suicides involve physicians and a 
right-to-die association: Agnes van der Heide, Luc Deliens, Karin Faisst, Tore Nilstun, 
0LFKDHO1RUXS(XJHQLR3DFL*HUULWYDQGHU:DODQG3DXO-YDQGHU0DDVµ(QG-of-life 
decision-PDNLQJLQVL[(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVGHVFULSWLYHVWXG\¶/DQFHW-
350, 347. Of course, this persuasiveness of this claim depends on the particularities of ending 
the existence of classes of novel beings. 
85 R (oao Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45 [68]. I think this last claim has less force for entities 
who are unable to perform suicide in some way. 
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form ought sometimes to diverge. To derive one potentially generalisable aid 
for the study of novel beings, there is merit in maintaining separation between 
the issue and its means of resolution. We ought not to expect the regulation of 
novel beings to mirror the regulation of ourselves. 
